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Government mandated drug-pricing policies are an understudied—but potentially 
significant—factor in the price of drugs.  The 340B program is one of the more controversial 
government-mandated prescription drug discount programs.  Proponents argue that the program 
helps health care systems cover the cost of care they provide for low-income patients. Critics argue 
that the program unfairly benefits certain health care systems by assuring them lower drug prices, 
drives consolidation and reduces competition in the health care market, and drives up the cost of 
drugs.  Despite this last claim, there is very little evidence that the 340B program actually impacts 
post-launch drug prices (i.e., the price of drugs once they are on the market).    
This project uses regression analysis to explore how growth in the 340B program—
specifically, growth in 340B hospitals that have 340B status because they serve a large number of 
low-income patients—impacts the cost of drugs administered in the outpatient setting (physician-
administered drugs). The project’s findings reveal that growth in this subset of 340B hospitals 
(DSH-340B sites) between 2008 and 2017 is associated with an increase in the price of physician-
administered drugs that were either on patent or had not been off-patent for more than four time 
periods (i.e., 24 months).  These findings serve as evidence that should be used to inform policy 











The US has some of the highest prescription drug prices in the world (Langreth et al., 2015).  
For example, 12 of the 13 drugs approved for cancer in 2012 cost more than $100,000 per year 
(Light and Kantarjian, 2013), and a month supply of Gilenya, a drug for multiple sclerosis, costs 
more than $5,400. These high prices have unintended consequences such as 1) increasing the taxes 
individuals pay to fund Medicare, 2) increasing the cost of insurance premiums, and 3) negatively 
impacting health outcomes.1  
A number of factors have been identified as contributors to high and rising drug costs 
including research and development, marketing and advertising,2 exclusivity rights in the form of 
patents, and consumer price insensitivity due to third party (i.e., health insurer) payment for drugs. 
Government mandated drug-pricing policies are a less well-studied—but potentially significant—
factor in the price of drugs.     
This project explores how the 340B program, a government-mandated prescription drug 
discount program, affects the post-launch price of drugs administered in the outpatient clinic 
setting (physician-administered drugs). My hypothesis is that growth in a subset of 340B 
organizations—namely, health care facilities that have 340B status because they are classified as  
                                                        
1 A 2013 study by Zafar et al. found that roughly 20% of insured cancer patients failed to adhere to medication 
instructions because of the high out-of-pocket costs they would have incurred. 
2 In 1998 the pharmaceutical industry spent $12.7 billion on various marketing schemes such as advertisements in 
medical journals, consumer ads, and free-samples securing it the 34th place in marketing expenditures (Pew, 2013). By 
2012, advertising costs had increased to $28 billion, 10 percent of the overall amount spent on prescription drugs that 
year (Pew, 2013). In 2013, the world’s ten largest pharmaceutical companies spent more on marketing and advertising 




disproportionate share hospital sites (DSH)3—has caused the price of physician-administered 
drugs to rise.  The aim of the project is to produce evidence that can be used to inform policy 
decisions regarding the future of the 340B program.    
 The paper proceeds as follows. I start by explaining the 340B program and how it can 
impact drug prices (chapter 2). I then situate my project within the current debate about the impact 
of the 340B program on health care spending (chapter 3). Next, I discuss the data with which I will 
be working (chapter 4). I then report the results of several descriptive and statistical analyses of the 
data (chapter 5). I conclude by discussing the relevance of these findings to the debate about how 
the 340B program impacts consumers and healthcare spending (chapter 6). The conclusion also 
reviews several limitations of the project and lays out potential next steps.  
 
  
                                                        
3 Disproportionate Share Hospitals are hospitals that serve a disproportionate number of low-income patients (i.e., 








THE 340B PROGRAM 
 
The 340B program was created by the US government in 1992 as a way to ensure that 
“covered entities” (i.e., certain types of hospitals) could provide care for uninsured and 
underinsured patients (MedPAC, 2015).4  Covered entities are organizations that provide significant 
amounts of care to poor individuals (e.g., disproportionate share hospitals—DSHs) or organizations 
that meet a specific social need (e.g., rural referral centers, children’s hospitals, critical access 
hospitals, etc.). The program requires drug manufacturers to give covered entities deep discounts 
on drugs in order for the drugs to be included on the Medicaid formulary. The discounted price 
allows the covered entities to realize greater profit margins on these drugs because their purchase 
prices are substantially lower than the prices they are reimbursed by both public and private 
payers. Covered entities are supposed to use the enhanced profit margin to help cover the cost of 
care they provide to their low-income, uninsured/underinsured patient populations. To fully 
appreciate how the 340B program benefits covered entities, it is important to understand how 
Medicare and commercial insurance companies pay for drugs.  
 
Drug Payment 
There are two basic types of drugs—self-administered and physician-administered—and 
two ways that Medicare and other insurers pay for them—the medical benefit and the pharmacy 
benefit.  
                                                        
4 At present, covered entities include public or non-profit disproportionate share hospitals, critical access hospitals, 




  Table 1: Two Types of Drugs 
 Self-Administered Drugs Physician-Administered Drugs 
Examples Anti-depressants, antibiotics, oral 
anti-cancer drugs, etc. 
Infused drugs (e.g., chemotherapy), 
certain injections, blood transfusions, etc. 




Pharmacy benefit Medical benefit 
 
Most small molecule drugs that are self-administered and prescribed in the outpatient 
setting are covered by a pharmacy benefit. A pharmacy benefit is an insurance plan that covers 
outpatient prescription drug costs. The pharmacy benefit works as follows: The clinician prescribes 
the drug, the patient gets the prescription filled at a pharmacy, and the pharmacy benefit pays the 
pharmacy for the drug. The pharmacy purchases the drugs they sell from either drug 
manufacturers or wholesalers and are able to make a profit by charging payers a price above the 
acquisition cost (see figure 1). Many commercial insurers bundle the pharmacy benefit into 
patients’ basic insurance plans though it is often administered through a pharmacy benefit manager 
(PBM) such as ExpressScripts or CVS Health. Medicare patients must purchase part D coverage in 
order to have a pharmacy benefit and the benefit they purchase is usually one that is administered 
by a PBM.  
 
 
Figure 1. Payment for Self-Administered Drugs Through the Pharmacy Benefit. The provider 
prescribes the patient a drug and the patient goes to a pharmacy to get the prescription filled. The 




wholesaler. The pharmacy then bills the patient’s insurer through the patient’s pharmacy benefit 
manager. The insurer pays the pharmacy benefit manager to conduct all of the negotiating and 
payment processes for the drug.   
 
Large molecule drugs such as biologics as well as other drugs that are administered in the 
outpatient clinic setting are generally paid for by a patient’s medical benefit.5 For most privately 
insured patients, the medical benefit pays for inpatient and outpatient medical services including 
the medical equipment and drugs administered in these settings. Medicare pays for services 
provided and drugs administered in the inpatient setting through their part A benefit, and they pay 
for services provided and drugs administered in the outpatient setting (i.e., physician-administered 
drugs) through their part B benefit.  The medical benefit works as follows: The clinician provides a 
service or administers a drug, they bill the insurer for the service or administered drug, and the 
insurer pays the clinician for the rendered service or administered drug.  When it comes to 
physician-administered drugs, this practice is referred to as the “buy-and-bill” method (see figure 
2) because the provider buys the drug from the manufacturer or wholesaler, administers it to the 




Figure 2. The Buy-and-Bill Method. The provider purchases the drug from the drug manufacturer or 
wholesaler. The provider then administers the drug to a patient and bills the patient’s insurer (i.e., 
the public or private payer) for the cost of administering the drug and the cost of the drug. Because 
                                                        




payers do not know the amount providers pay for these drugs, they will often negotiate with the 
provider to reimburse them at a fixed percentage of the average sales price of the drug. 
 
The 340B Benefit 
Providers with 340B status benefit because they are guaranteed a reduced price when 
acquiring 340B eligible drugs. A 2015 MedPAC report, for instance, found that the minimum 
discount covered entities receive is 22.5% of the drug’s average sale price (ASP). Thus, a drug that 
has an average sales price of $1,000 would only cost a 340B program $775 to acquire. 
Because providers do not sell self-administered drugs directly to patients (and do not 
receive payment for these drugs from the insurer), they must pursue another route to realize the 
benefit of the price reduction on these drugs. The solution is that they contract with a pharmacy. 
There are several ways that contract pharmacies can operate. The following is a basic model: the 
provider purchases the drugs at the reduced 340B price from the manufacturer or wholesaler and 
has them delivered to the contract pharmacy. After the pharmacy sells the drug to the patient and is 
paid by the insurer, the pharmacy reimburses the provider the retail sale price of the drug minus an 
order management fee that the pharmacy keeps.  
Providers with 340B benefit from physician-administered drugs in a slightly different, but 
more straight forward, manner. As already mentioned, for physician-administered drugs, the 
provider engages in the buy-and-bill process—i.e., the provider purchases the drug from either the 
manufacturer or a distributor, and then, after administering the drug to the patient, the provider 
bills the patient’s insurer, who pays for the drug. Providers with 340B benefit because they get the 
physician-administered drugs at a lower price, but insurers reimburse them at the normal, fixed 
rate.  For example, assuming the minimum discount covered entities receive is 22.5% of the drug’s 
average sale price (ASP), a provider with 340B status who is reimbursed for physician-
administered drugs at ASP + 6%, the amount Medicare generally reimburses at, will have a profit 








SITUATING THE CURRENT PROJECT 
 
In recent years, there has been increasing scrutiny of the 340B program.  While there is 
some evidence that the 340B program improves care for some low-income patient populations 
(Castellon et al., 2014), opponents and skeptics argue that it introduces incentives that conflict with 
providing optimal patient care at the lowest cost. And there is some evidence that it has, in fact, 
contributed to the rise in overall health care spending and inappropriate drug use. 
A 2015 Government Accountability Office (GAO) study, for instance, found that spending at 
340B hospitals (i.e., hospitals that receive 340B pricing) was substantially higher and that these 
hospitals prescribe “more drugs or more expensive drugs” than non-340B hospitals. Importantly, 
the GAO notes that the difference in spending was not explained by differences in patients’ health—
i.e., it was not because 340B hospitals were treating sicker patients.6 The study concluded that the 
340B program incentivizes greater drug use and/or the use of more expensive drugs. Another 
study by Conti and Bach (2014) found that 340B organizations registered after 2004 were more 
likely to be located in wealthier communities with better payer mixes (i.e., higher rates of privately 
insured individuals) than those registered prior to 2004, a finding that is seemingly inconsistent 
with the program’s original intent to help impoverished patients. Finally, research sponsored by the 
Community Oncology Alliance and the Berkeley Research Group used several data sets including 
CMS Medicare Outpatient Claims data and data on 340B sales from several drug manufacturers to 
identify the 340B program as a major driver of consolidation in the health care provider market, 
                                                        
6 The study did not look at the connection between spending and health outcomes so it is possible that the increase in 




especially hospital acquisition of private oncology practices (Vandervelde, 2014).7 Many believe 
that increased consolidation causes health care costs to rise because care provided in the hospital 
setting is more expensive than that provided in private practices (Gaynor and Town, 2012).   
Other critics of the program argue it plays a role in driving up drug prices. The idea behind 
this line of criticism is that drug manufacturers simply shift the cost of the 340B program by 
increasing the price they charge for drugs. Because the 340B program has been rapidly growing, 
these skeptics argue that the impact of the program on drug prices is also rapidly increasing.   
Given the interest in drug prices and the intuitive reasoning for how growth in the 340B 
program could impact prices, it is surprising that relatively little work has been done in this area. It 
is even more surprising given that previous research showed that government mandated drug 
discount programs likely lead to higher drug prices. For example, a 1996 study by the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) found that drug manufacturers increased the best price they 
offered purchasers by almost 17% to offset a drug rebate they were required to provide state 
Medicaid programs. The one paper that discusses the impact of the 340B program on drug prices 
did not conduct an analysis to identify the program’s impact on post-launch drug prices. Rather, 
Howard et al. (2015) used least squares regression to show that a 10% annual increase in the 
launch price of anti-cancer drugs is not attributable to common drug characteristics, and they 
suggested that the 340B program may be partially responsible for the increase as it may encourage 
drug manufacturers to raise launch prices to help cover revenue losses they expect to incur from 
the 340B discounts.8  
As Howard et al. (2015) note, drug manufacturers may set launch prices high so they can 
avoid having to raise post-launch prices to offset the impact of the 340B program. This is likely a 
                                                        
7 A 2017 paper by Alpert et al. looking at the impact of 340B expansion under the ACA found that ACA-expansion 340B 
entities—i.e., entities that got 340B status due to the ACA expansion—explains very little of the recent consolidation in 
the oncology space.  This finding, however, fails to negate the earlier finding from the Community Oncology Alliance and 
Berkeley Research Group because DSH 340B entities (i.e., entities that have 340B status because they serve a significant 
number of low-income patients) were not significantly impacted by the ACA expansion, and these are the 340B entities 
that are most likely to provide cancer care and, therefore, the most likely to purchase private oncology practices. 




strategic decision meant to avoid negative publicity. After all, large price increases post-launch are 
often seen as attempts to price-gouge patients and tend to be received negatively in the press. As an 
example, one need only consider the publicity Martin Shrkeli and Turing Pharmaceuticals received 
after their massive price hike (over 5,000%) on Daraprim, a drug used to treat AIDs-related and 
AIDs-unrelated toxoplasmosis. But not all post-launch price increases are large enough to trigger a 
negative publicity campaign. Indeed, the price increases manufacturers institute to recoup revenue 
lost through the 340B program may be quite small.  Over time, however, these small increases add 
up and can have a significant impact on consumers.  
To my knowledge, no research to date has looked at how the 340B program affects post-
launch drug prices. Thus, there is a gap in the knowledge necessary to understand how the 340B 
program impacts consumers and the health care system.  This project aims to fill that gap by 
analyzing how growth in a subset of 340B entities—namely, DSH-340B sites—affects the post-












 In this chapter, I discuss the data sources I use to construct the panel data set to test my 
hypothesis that growth in the number of DSH-340B sites causes the price of physician-administered 
drugs to rise.  The panel consists of 9.5 years of pricing data on 35 drugs.  Drug price serves as the 
dependent variable, the number of DSH-340B sites as the independent variable of interest, and a 
slew of other variables as controls.  
 
Physician-Administered Drugs 
The sample consists of 35 physician-administered drugs (see table 2). The sample consists 
entirely of this type of drug because there is available price data (CMS’s ASP Drug Pricing Files, 
discussed below) that has been used in previous drug price research. This data exists because CMS 
requires all drug manufacturers that wish to be listed on the Medicaid formulary to submit 
quarterly average sales prices (ASP) for their physician-administered drugs. Medicare uses this 
data to set the rate that they will reimburse providers, and they make the data publicly available to 
provide transparency to beneficiaries, providers, and the public.  
The sample does not include any self-administered drugs because data on pricing for this 
class of drugs is simply too challenging to locate or too costly to acquire. Since Medicare doesn’t 
directly reimburse pharmacies for self-administered outpatient drugs (the pharmacy benefit 
manager administering the part D plan does that), they don’t require drug manufacturers to submit 




  Table 2. Physician-Administered Drugs in Entire Sample and Price Changes  











Adalimumab Humira Arthritis 171% 19 
18% Expired pd 18 
Afilbercept (optical) Eylea Ocular 0% 6 
0% Yes 
ziv-Afilbercept Zaltrap Cancer -14% 7 
-4% Yes 
Basiliximab Simulect Transplant 133% 19  
14% Yes 
Bevacizumab Avastin Cancer 19% 19 
2% Yes 
Bortezomib Velcade Cancer 38% 19 
4% Expired pd 19 
Cabazitaxel Jevtana Cancer 11% 11 
2% Expired pd 17 
Capecitabine oral Xeloda Cancer -45% 15 
6% Expired pd 12 
Carboplatin Paraplatin Cancer -57% 19 
-6% No 
Certolizumab pegol Cimzia Crohns 105% 15 
14% Yes 
Cetuximab Erbitux Cancer 19% 19 
2% Expired pd 17 
Cisplatin Platinol Cancer -19% 19 
-2% No 
Docetaxel Taxotere Cancer -76% 19 
-8% Expired pd 5 
Eculizumab Soliris Bd 34% 17 
4% Yes 
Everolimus oral Afinitor Cancer 33% 11 
6% Yes 
Filgrastim G-CSF Neupogen Cancer 48% 16 
6% Expired pd 12 
Filgrastim tbo Granix Cancer -12% 6 
-4% Yes 
Golimumab Simponi Arthritis 0% 6 
0% Yes 
Infliximab Remicade Arthritis  57% 19 
6% Yes 
Ipilumimab Yervoy Cancer 11% 11 
2% Yes 
Methotrexate Trexall Arthritis 0% 19 
0% No 
Necitumumab Portrazza Cancer . 1 
. Yes 
Nivolumab Opvido Cancer 3% 3 
2% Yes 
Paclitaxel inj Taxol Cancer -57% 19 
-6% No 
Panitumumab Vectibix Cancer 38% 19 
4% Yes 
Pefgfilgrastim Neulasta Cancer 75% 
19 (missing 
time pd 4) 
7.9% Expired pd 16 
Pembrolizumab Keytruda Cancer 3% 3 
2% Yes 
Pemetrexed Alimta Cancer 38% 19 
4% Yes 
Pentostatin Nipent Cancer 0% 
19 (missing 
time pd 4  & 
6) 
0% No 
Ramucirumab Cyramza Cancer 3% 3 
2% Yes 
Ranibizumab Lucentis Ocular 0% 19 
0% Yes 
Rituximab Rituxan Cancer 57% 19 
6% Expired pd 18 
Sipuleucel-T Provenge Cancer 11% 11 
2% Yes 
Trastuzumab Herceptin Cancer 57% 19 
6% Yes 
Topotecan (oral) Hycamtin Cancer 14% 7 
4% No (not available until 
pd 8 when it went off 
patent) 
                                                        




are reimbursed by pharmacy benefit managers on behalf of Medicare and commercial insurers 
rarely share their acquisition costs as this is considered a confidential part of their pricing 
contracts.  Thus, there is no publicly available data on the pricing of self-administered drugs like 
there is for physician-administered drugs.  
It is worth noting that many of the drugs in the sample are very costly—well over $1,000 
per treatment. The fact that the sample is largely comprised of high-cost drugs could bias the 
project’s findings. For instance, it could be that the findings only apply to high-cost physician-
administered drugs. I discuss this point in the conclusion when I review limitations of the project.  
 
ASP Drug Pricing Files 
The physician-administered drug prices (i.e., drug prices) are from the CMS ASP (average 
sales price) Drug Pricing Files. These files, which are updated every three months, provide the ASP 
of all physician-administered drugs for which Medicare reimburses providers.10 As already noted, 
because the acquisition cost of these drugs varies by purchaser and is kept confidential, the 
Medicare ASP is the best indicator of the drugs’ prices.   
 
DSH-340B Sites 
The explanatory variable of interest is the subset of 340B covered entity sites that have that 
status because they are disproportionate share hospitals or outpatient departments of a 
disproportionate share hospital (i.e., DSH-340B sites).11 To identify the number of DSH-340B sites 
for each year, I analyzed the registry of 340B covered entities maintained by Health Resources and 
Services Administration (HRSA).  The registry’s annual count is used as the site count for the first 
                                                        
10 The ASP for each drug is a per-unit price, and different drugs are priced at different units. For example, a unit of Avastin 
is 10mg and it is dosed at 10mg/kg, while a unit of Humira is 20mg and it is dosed at 40mg for adults.  Thus, in 2017, a 
dose of Humira for an adult would cost $1,068.52 and a dose of Avastin would cost $5,449.93.    
11 A single 340B covered entity can have multiple covered entity sites. For instance, Hospital X is a covered entity because 
it has 340B status and the five hospital outpatient departments located at different addresses that are part of the Hospital 




half of the year (January-June). To determine the number of sites for the second half of the year 
(July-December), I subtracted the current year’s count from the following year’s count, divided this 
by 2 and then added this to the current year’s count.12  Figure 3 illustrates the number of DSH-340B 
sites for the period January 1, 2008- January 1, 2017. 
 
 
Figure 3. 10-Year Growth in DSH-340B Sites (January 1, 2008 to January 1, 2017) 
  
The analysis focuses on DSH-340B sites because growth among this group is the most likely 
to impact the price of physician-administered drugs.  This is because DSH-340B sites are the type of 
340B entity that provides significant amounts of physician-administered drug services—e.g., 
infusions, transfusions, injections.  
It is worth pointing out that the current analysis does not include freestanding cancer 
hospitals with 340B status. This may seem odd given that freestanding cancer hospitals provide a 
substantial number of physician-administered drugs to patients. However, given that there is only 
                                                        
12 Formula: [{number of DSH-340B sites (year t+1) - number of DSH-340B sites (year t)}/2]  + number of DSH-340B sites 




one freestanding cancer hospital—City of Hope—with 340B status, the actual number of physician-
administered drugs provided by 340B freestanding cancer hospitals is likely minimal. Leaving them 
out is unlikely to bias the project’s findings.  
 
Time Periods 
The data set covers 19 time periods. Each time period covers six months from January 1, 
2008 to January 1, 2017. The six-month periods run from January to June (e.g., period 1) and July to 
December (e.g., period 2). The six-month blocks coincide with the Medicare pricing report for the 
first quarter (prices for January through March) and the third quarter of the year (prices for July 
through September).  Some drugs do not have 19 periods of data as they were either brought to 












The following chapter reviews the results of several analyses. The first section provides 
descriptive analysis of DSH-340B sites and the physician-administered drugs in the sample. The 




 A review of the data reveals that the number of DSH-340B sites grew by 744% over the 9.5 
year period (see figure 3).  Table 3 offers year over year growth.  While the years 2011 and 2012 
experienced the greatest percentage growth, the number of DSH-340B sites increased by at least 
2,000 annually between 2011 and 2017. Growth is primarily due to hospitals acquiring private 
practices throughout the period, and not to a larger number of hospitals receiving DSH-340B status 
(Vandervelde , 2014).   
It’s important to note that the period 2011-2015 was a time of increased consolidation 
across health care. Hospitals with 340B status and those without sought to acquire private 
practices or other hospitals to gain economics of scale, increase negotiating power with commercial 
payers, and secure referrals (Ginsburg, 2016; Alpert et al., 2017). This increase in consolidation was 
partially a response to commercial payers’ attempts to gain greater negotiating power through 
mergers and acquisitions and rein in costs by decreasing network size (i.e., the number of health 




with 340B status were more likely to acquire private practices than those without 340B status 
during this period (Avalere Health LLC, 2016).   
 



















15% 14% 9% 66% 49% 38% 28% 23% 11% 
 
Drug Prices 
A review of the period price for each drug from January 2008 to January 2017 reveals 
extensive variation. Table 3 reports the percent price change for each drug in the sample. Not all 
drugs were available for the entire 19 time periods as some came to market during this time while 
others went off market. Commonly-used, patent-protected drugs like Adalimumab (mean price 
$1,068.52) and Bevacizumab (mean price $5,449.93) increased substantially over the 9.5 year 
period.13 As figures 4 and 5 illustrate, prices shot up around 2012, the tenth time period.  This 
coincides with a period of increased growth in the number of DSH-340B sites (see figure 3 above).  
In general, the price of drugs that were on-patent as of 2008 increased or stayed steady.  
               
Figure 4. Average Sales Price for Adalimumab          Figure 5. Average Sales Price for Bevacizumab 
(January 1, 2008-January 1, 2017)           (January 1, 2008-January 1, 2017)       
 
 
                                                        





Relatively new drugs, such as Nivolumab (mean price $6,291.72) and Pembrolizumab 
(mean price $9,383.50), showed very little price fluctuation (see table 3). It is possible that the 
launch prices of these drugs were set with the impact of 340B in mind and, therefore, there has 
been less need to increase the post-launch prices of these drugs. This explanation is consistent with 
the Howard et al. (2015) hypothesis regarding the impact of 340B on drug launch prices.  It is also 
possible that these drugs are so new that the manufacturers have yet to increase the prices.  
Carboplatin and Methotrexate, two older drugs whose patents expired prior to 2008, 
experienced substantial price decreases over the 9.5 year period.  Figure 6 illustrates price changes 
for Carboplatin (mean price $74.30), which was off-patent for the entire 9.5 year period. 
Interestingly, the greatest price change for this drug occurred prior to the explosion of growth in 
DSH-340B sites.  The initial drop followed by relative stability could be due to entry of generic 
drugs.  Methotrexate (mean price $4.76), a drug that has been available since the 1940s 
experienced a sharp decline during the first ten time periods and then rebounded, only to drop 
again (figure 7).  
 
           
Figure 6: Average Sales Price for Carboplatin            Figure 7: Average Sales Price for Methotrexate 
(January 1, 2008-January 1, 2017)            (January 1, 2008-January 1, 2017)       
 
Figure 8 illustrates how patent-expiration can affect a drug’s price. Capecitabine oral (mean 




period, and then it entered a steady decline.  Finally, the price of Filgrastim (mean price $352) rose 
until the 13th time period where it plateaued (figure 9).14 The plateau coincides with the drug’s 
patent expiration (12th time period).  
 
               
Figure 8: Average Sales Price for Capecitabine            Figure 9: Average Sales Price for Filgrastim 




Certain subsets of drugs are more likely to be impacted by growth in the 340B program, so 
the analysis was run on five different groups (see table 4). The first group (group A) included all 
drugs in the sample, and addresses the question of whether DSH-340B expansion impacts all drugs, 
regardless of whether they are patent-protected or not.  
Drugs that are off-patent and have generic substitutes may respond differently to growth in 
the number of DSH-340B sites, so the analysis was run on two other groups (group B and group C) 
that excluded off-patent drugs. Group B only excluded drugs that were off-patent for the entire 9.5 
year period.  
The third group (group C) excluded drugs that were off-patent for more than four time 
periods (24 months). Regression analysis looking at a large number of lags on patent-expiration 
                                                        




indicated that the prices for drugs that went-off patent during the 9.5 year period did not usually 
start to decrease until the fifth time period after patent expiration. The delay in price reduction 
associated with patent expiration is probably due to the time lag between patent expiration and 
generic entry (i.e., it often takes several months to years for generics to get approval and enter the 
market) and the time lag needed to obtain pricing data that reflects generic entry (CMS sets ASP on 
the previous quarter’s sales data, so the impact of generics on ASP will not be reflected 
immediately). The drugs in group C provide insight into how growth in the number of DSH-340B 
sites impacts drugs that do not have generic substitutes or whose prices have not yet been 
impacted by generics in the market.  
The fourth group (group D) includes drugs that were top 20 bestsellers in 2016. All of these 
drugs were patent-protected in 2008 if they were on the market. Several of the drugs in this sample 
did not come to market until after 2008. This group is important because these drugs contribute 
such a large amount to their manufacturers’ revenue streams. Given their contribution, 
manufacturers may be more inclined to raise the prices of these drugs than the prices of drugs that 
make a smaller revenue contribution to recover money lost through the 340B program.  
Accordingly, growth in the number of DSH-340B sites should have a more significant impact on this 
group—both practically and statistically—than it does on groups A, B, or C.  
The fifth and final group consists of all drugs that were off-patent for more than four 
periods. This group is used to provide insight into how growth in the number of DSH-340B sites 
impacts the price of drugs that aren’t patent-protected and have generic substitutes in the market.15  
                                                        
15 The group only includes drugs off-patent for more than four periods to ensure generics have been on the market long 









Excluding Drugs Off 
Patent Before 2008 
Group C 
Entire Sample 
Excluding Drugs Off 






Drugs Off Patent 
More Than 4 
Periods 
Adalimumab Adalimumab Adalimumab Adalimumab  




ziv-Afilbercept ziv-Afilbercept ziv-Afilbercept   
Basiliximab Basiliximab Basiliximab   
Bevacizumab Bevacizumab Bevacizumab Bevacizumab  
Bortezomib Bortezomib Bortezomib   
Cabazitaxel Cabazitaxel Cabazitaxel   
Capecitabine oral Capecitabine oral   Capecitabine oral 
Carboplatin 
 
  Carboplatin 
Certolizumab pegol Certolizumab pegol Certolizumab pegol   
Cetuximab Cetuximab Cetuximab   
Cisplatin 
 
  Cisplatin 
Docetaxel Docetaxel   Docetaxel 
Eculizumab Eculizumab Eculizumab   
Everolimus oral Everolimus oral Everolimus oral   
Filgrastim G-CSF Filgrastim G-CSF  Filgrastim G-CSF Filgrastim G-CSF 
Filgrastim tbo Filgrastim tbo  Filgrastim tbo Filgrastim tbo 
Golimumab Golimumab Golimumab   
Infliximab Infliximab Infliximab Infliximab  
Ipilumimab Ipilumimab Ipilumimab   
Methotrexate 
 
  Methotrexate 
Necitumumab Necitumumab Necitumumab   
Nivolumab Nivolumab Nivolumab   
Paclitaxel inj 
 
  Paclitaxel inj 
Panitumumab Panitumumab Panitumumab   
Pefgfilgrastim Pefgfilgrastim Pefgfilgrastim Pefgfilgrastim  
Pembrolizumab Pembrolizumab Pembrolizumab   
Pemetrexed Pemetrexed Pemetrexed   
Pentostatin 
 
  Pentostatin 
Ramucirumab Ramucirumab Ramucirumab   
Ranibizumab Ranibizumab Ranibizumab   
Rituximab Rituximab Rituximab Rituximab  
Sipuleucel-T Sipuleucel-T Sipuleucel-T   
Trastuzumab Trastuzumab Trastuzumab Trastuzumab  
Topotecan (oral) 
 






The analysis of the panel data set was conducted using a random-effects generalized least 
squares model (see model specification below). The model uses log transformations of both real 
drug prices,16 the dependent variable, and number of DSH-340B sites, the independent variable of 
interest.  The model includes controls for: 
1. Patent expiration and two lags of patent expiration because off-patent drugs may respond 
differently to changes in the number of DSH-340B sites than patent-protected drugs 
2. Two lags of a dummy variable for the time period that the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (PPACA) was passed because this program expanded the scope of the 340B 
program and may have induced manufacturers to raise prices more aggressively 
3. A dummy variable for periods when Democrats controlled both the house and the 
presidency because manufacturers may preemptively raise drug prices to counteract cost-
shifting and drug cost-containment policies they assume Democrats will pursue when they 
have control 
4. The unemployment rate for each period because changes in unemployment translate to 
changes in the size of the population of low-income individuals and this can impact the 
number of hospitals eligible for DSH-340B status 
 
GLS Random Effects Model 
Υlog_of_real_drug_price = βlog_of_DSH_340B_entities +βpatent_expiration_period + βlag_1_of_patent_expiration_period + 
βlag_2_of_patent_expiration_period + βlag_1_of_PPACA + βlag_2_of_PPACA + βunemployment  + βdemocratic_control+ ε   
 
 The random effects model was chosen after running the hausman test and finding that the 
null hypothesis—that individual level effects are appropriately captured by the random effects 
model—could not be rejected  (prob >chi2 = 0.2882).   
                                                        




 Table 5 reports the results from the GLS random effects model.17 The most relevant finding 
is that the number of DSH-340B sites is significant for groups C and D.  For group C, a 1% change in 
the number of DSH-340B sites is associated with a 0.11% change in drug price. While this seems 
modest, it actually translates into a fairly substantial price increase given that growth in sites 
ranged between 66% and 11% annually over the 9.5 year period. For example, the 33% growth that 
occurred in the first half of 2011 translates into a 3.6% increase in drug price for this period. See 
table 6 for the actual dollar amount of the increase for select drugs.  
For group D, a 1% change in the number of DSH-340B sites is associated with a 0.16% 
change in drug price (5.3% price increase given a 33% increase in the number of DSH-340B sites). 
This suggests that the impact of DSH-340B growth is slightly greater on group D drugs (blockbuster 
drugs) than group C drugs.  This finding seems reasonable given that these drugs contribute so 
much revenue and manufacturers are probably looking to protect these drug prices more 
aggresively.   
Growth in 340B entities is negatively associated with the price of drugs in group E (i.e., 
drugs off-patent for more than four periods). A 1% increase in the number of DSH-340B sites is 
associated with a 0.36% decrease in drug price (11.9% price decrease given a 33% increase in the 
number of DSH-340B sites).  Despite this finding, it is unlikely that growth in the number of DSH-
340B sites is actually causing the price drop for group E drugs. The more likely explanation is that 
expanded health insurance coverage and the aging of the population which is leading to increased 
disease incidence18 is increasing demand for these drugs.  And, because there are relatively few 
                                                        
17 The analysis was run using several variants of this model to test the significance of other potential control variables. 
The first model (appendix A) replaced the log of DSH-340B sites with the first lag of this variable because it is possible 
that growth in the number of DSH-340B sites has a delayed affect on drug prices. The model was run to explore whether 
the lag of the independent variable of interest (number of DSH-340B sites) has a greater impact on drug prices than the 
present period independent variable. The second model included dummies for time period 3 through time period 19 
(Appendix B). The third model added a time trend variable to the base model (Appendix C). The fourth model added a lag 
of the dependent variable to construct a time series model (Appendix D). The results from these models are included as 
appendices. 
18 Expanded health insurance coverage is largely due to passage and implementation of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA). Increasing cancer incidence is likely the primary driver here given that most drugs in the 




barriers to market entry for generics since these drugs are off-patent, the increase in demand is 
causing the price of group E drugs to drop. Unfortunately, the model doesn’t control for increasing 
disease incidence or changes in health insurance coverage so it is difficult to properly assess this 
hypothesis.19  
Growth in the number of DSH-340B sites was insignificant for groups A and B. Given what 
we know about the negative association between off-patent drug prices and number of DSH-340B 
sites (group E findings) and the positive association between on-patent drug prices and number of 
DSH-340B sites (group C and group D findings), this is not terribly surprising. After all, group A and 
group B include both off-patent drugs and on-patent drugs. Because the model didn’t control for 
increasing demand20, the DSH-340B variable may have picked up the effect of this—i.e., the 
decrease in off-patent drug prices.  If this is what happened, then the impact of DSH-340B sites may 
have been counterbalanced by the impact of demand and the resulting estimate for the DSH-340B 
variable may have been subject to ommitted variable bias. Thus, we need to interpret the findings 
regarding group A and group B drugs cautiously.  
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act  (PPACA) is associated with a very small, 
delayed increase in the price of drugs in group C and D. Manufacturers may have increased prices 
for the drugs in these two group in anticipation of declining revenue resulting from the PPACA’s 
expansion of the 340B program. The PPACA increased the size of the 340B program by making it 
possible for critical access hospitals and freestanding cancer hospitals21 that meet DSH 
requirements to get 340B status.22  The PPACA’s expansion of 340B may not have affected the other   
                                                        
19 Importantly, growth in disease incidence is unlikely to impact the price of drugs in  group C and group D because there 
are barriers to entry since these drugs are either patent-protected or just off patent.  
20 Increasing demand due to increasing disease incidence and expanded health insurance coverage. 
21 Freestanding Cancer hospitals are specialty hospitals that only treat cancer patients. At present, there are only eleven 
freestanding cancer hospitals in the United States, and only one of them meets the DSH requirements and has 340B status.   
22 The estimated lagged impact of the PPACA is probably so small because expansion of the 340B program under the 
PPACA was unlikely to significantly impact drug manufacturers’ revenue since most critical access hospitals do not 
provide a large number of physician-administered drugs and there is only one freestanding cancer hospital that meets the 




  Table 5. Regression Results for GLS Random Effects Model 
Log of Real Drug 
Price 
Group A Group B Group C Group D Group E 
Log of number of 
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  Table 6. Impact of 33% Growth in DSH-340B Sites on Mean Drug Price 
 Drug 
Group 
Mean price per 
unit 












Adalimumab  C, D 534.26       /20mg $1,068.52 $38.47 $56.63 -$127.15 
Cabazitaxel  C 148.82       /1mg $7,441 $267.88 $394.37 -$885.48 
Carboplatin  E 5.16           /50mg $74.30 $2.67 $3.94 -$8.84 
Filgrastim  D, E 0.88           /1mcg $352 $12.67 $18.66 -$41.89 
Infliximab  C, D 70.47        /10mg $1,128 $40.61 $59.78 -$134.23 
Pegfilgrastim  C, D 3131.39    /6mg $3,131.39 $112.73 $165.96 -$372.64 
Pentostatin E 1527.48   /10mg $1,221.98 $43.99 $64.76 -$145.42 






drug groups because they include off-patent drugs that may have experienced a price decrease due 
to greater demand created by increasing disease incidence and expansion of insurance coverage.   
The analysis also reveals that patent expiration is associated with a price increase for group 
A, group B, and group D drugs. The period a drug goes off patent is associated with a 30% price 
increase for group A, a 28% price increase for group B, and a 12% price increase for group D. In 
addition to its association with increased price in the current time period, patent expiration 
continues to be asssociated with a price increase for at least two more periods in these groups. As 
noted earlier, for most drugs that went off-patent during the 9.5 year period, prices continued to 
rise for three or four periods after patent expiration and only started decreasing thereafter (e.g., see 
Figure 8: Capecitabine oral). The post-patent expiration price increase is likely due to two things: 1) 
delayed market entry because generic manufacturers need to obtain approvals, licenses, and set up 
production, and 2) the name-brand manufacturer attempting to extract as much revenue as 
possible from the drug before generics enter the market. The price decline occuring several periods 
after patent expiration reflects the actual entry of generics into the market. The conclusion 
discusses the issue of manufacturer game-playing around patent-expiration in a bit more detail.    
Having a Democratic controlled house and presidency was only significant for group D 
drugs. Democratic control of these branches of government is associated with a small price 
increase—about 0.02%. One explanation for this finding is that Democrats are more likely to pass 
laws that attempt to cross-subsidize health care, such as expanding the scope of the 340B program, 
and if these laws attempt to shift costs to drug manufacturers, they may simply shift them on to 
consumers in the form of higher drug prices. While statistically significant, the coefficient on this 
variable is practically insignificant.   
The unemployment rate was insignificant across all drug groups. This variable was included 
because greater unemployment would presumably lead to more individuals falling in the low-




large enough number of low-income patients to become eligible for DSH-340B status. One result of 
growth in the number of DSH-340B sites due to unemployment, at least according to my hypothesis, 
is that drug prices would go up. The analysis found no evidence that unemployment had an impact 













The previous analyses show that my original hypothesis—that growth in the number of 
DSH-340B sites is causing physician-administered drug prices to rise—is only partially supported 
because growth in the number of DSH-340B sites was only found to be associated with a price 
increase for certain types of physician-administered drugs—namely, on-patent drugs and drugs 
that have not been off-patent for more than four periods.   
My findings suggest that the 340B program may not actually be accomplishing the cross-
subsidization it aims for. In theory, the program has pharmaceutical manufacturers subsidize care 
for low-income patients by requiring them to sell drugs to 340B eligible sites at a discount.  What 
appears to happen, however, is that drug manufacturers simply shift the cost of the discount to 
other payers by increasing the price they charge for drugs.  So, individuals end up subsidizing low-
income patients’ care because their insurance premiums and the taxes they pay to support 
Medicare increase in order to cover the higher drug prices. Policy makers need to keep this finding 
in mind as they evaluate the impact of the 340B program and whether it is meetings its proposed 
aim.  
In addition, policymakers need to determine whether it matters if the 340B program is 
meeting its intended goal of having drug manufacturers subsidize care for low-income patients. 
After all, if the more immediate concern is to use the program to cross-subsidize care for low-
income individuals, regardless of who ends up shouldering the final cost, then the 340B program is 




manufacturers shoulder these costs, then it appears to be failing, and policymakers should consider 
pursuing other means to achieve this end.  
Moving forward, there are several possibilities policymakers should consider.23 First, cross-
subsidies are not uncommon in health care (e.g., commercial payers reimburse providers at a rate 
substantially higher than Medicaid and Medicare to help subsidize the cost of care for Medicaid and 
Medicare patients), and it could be argued that it is justified to shift some of the cost of physician-
administered drugs to individuals. This would be tantamount to letting the 340B program continue 
as it is. Second, the 340B program could be revamped to ensure that 340B hospitals only receive 
340B pricing for drugs administered to patients that are low-income. At present, DSH-340B 
hospitals receive the reduced price on drugs for all of their patients, even if the patient is not low-
income. This sort of change would decrease the impact of the 340B program on drug 
manufacturers’ revenue and would reduce their need to shift costs by increasing post-launch prices. 
HRSA’s24 340B Program Omnibus Guidance sought to implement this sort of change, but it was 
officially withdrawn by the Trump administration in early 2017. Third, the 340B program could be 
redesigned to ensure that drug manufacturers actually shoulder the cost of the 340B program. It is 
unclear how this could be achieved, but it would probably require more governmental intervention 
than the current administration is likely to allow.     
Another interesting finding from this project centers on the way that drug prices change 
around the patent expiration period. As noted before, the analysis reveals that a drug’s price 
increases at a higher rate for about three to four periods after the patent expires.  One would 
assume that the price would drop after patent-expiration since generics can enter the market.  
However, several factors, including delay between patent-expiration and generic entry and the lag 
between generic market entry and impact on name-brand price, can take some time.  During this 
period, manufacturers are likely trying to extract as much revenue as possible. It is also possible 
                                                        
23 All of these potential moves are widely discussed in policy and academic circles. 




that manufacturers understand that certain consumers will be brand loyal and willing to pay a 
premium for the name-brand drug. So, they may be attempting to increase the price as much as 
possible with the understanding that the remaining market (i.e., those that are brand-loyal) will be 
less price-sensitive.25 Policymakers need to keep these findings around patent-expiration in mind 
as they continue to explore how patent policy affects drug prices and the role of generics in the 
drug market.   
Before concluding, it is worth noting that the findings from this analysis may not generalize 
to self-administered drugs. The way these drugs are paid for is slightly different and, as a result, 
they may respond differently to growth in the number of DSH-340B sites.   It is also possible that 
the findings do not apply to low-cost physician-administered drugs.  Because the sample was 
largely comprised of drugs that cost over $1,000 per dose, it is unclear whether the findings will 
generalize to drugs at all cost-levels.  
To address these limitations, next steps in the project would likely include obtaining a 
larger data set with more off-patent drugs and lower-cost physician-administered drugs. If possible, 
it would also help to run a similar analysis on self-administered drugs.  And finally, further analysis 
should attempt to identify proxies to control for increasing disease incidence and changes in health 
insurance coverage.   
 
  
                                                        
25 The topics of brand-loyalty and price sensitivity for drugs and the market conditions necessary for generics to reduce 
brand-name prices have been discussed in some detail in the literature (see e.g., Conti & Berndt, 2014). Space constraints 





Regression Results for Model Using Lag of DSH-340B 
 
Υlog_of_real_drug_ASP = βlag_of_log_of_DSH_340B_entities +βpatent_expiration_period + βlag_1_of_patent_expiration_period + 
βlag_2_of_patent_expiration_period + βlag_1_of_PPACA + βlag_2_of_PPACA + βunemployment  + βdemocratic_control  + ε   
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This model used the lag of log of DSH-340B sites as the independent variable of interest. 
The findings are analagous to those for the model using the log of DSH-340B sites as the 
independent variable (the model discussed in the results section). The key difference is that the  
magnitude of the coefficients on the independent variable of interest—number of DSH-340B sites—





Regression Results for Model with Time Dummies 
 
Υlog_of_real_drug_ASP = βlog_of_DSH_340B_entities +βpatent_expiration_period + βlag_1_of_patent_expiration_period + 
βlag_2_of_patent_expiration_period + βtime_pd_3 – time_pd_19 + ε   
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This model includes dummies for time period 3 through time period 19. Time periods 1 and 
2,  the 2 lags on PPACA, the dummy variable for Democratic control, and the unemployment 
variable were excluded because there was collinearity when they were included.  Inclusion of these 
variables did not seem necessary as the aim here was to identify significant time periods.   
Log of DSH-340B is still significant for groups C , D, and E, but the direction of the 
association is opposite what was found in the paper. Furthermore, for most drug groups, time 
periods were statistically significant. It is important to note that there is a positive trend in both the 
number of DSH-340B sites and most drug prices over the 9.5 year period. Thus, it is possible that 
the time dummies were picking up the effects of each period, which included growth in DSH-340B 
sites. Accordingly, each time period may be significant because the number of DSH-340B sites 
increased each period. This possibility helps to explain why the estimates in this model are so 





Regression Results for Model with Time Trend Variable 
 
Υlog_of_real_drug_ASP = βlog_of_DSH_340B_entities +βpatent_expiration_period + βlag_1_of_patent_expiration_period + 
βlag_2_of_patent_expiration_period + βlag_1_of_PPACA + βlag_2_of_PPACA + βunemployment  + βdemocratic_control  + 
βtime_trend  + ε   
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This model included a time trend variable to control for unknown factors that may impact 
drug prices. The time trend variable includes all time periods (time_trend=1 if time_pd==1, 
time_trend=2 if time_pd==2, . . . time_trend==19 if time_pd==19). Inclusion of the time trend 
washed out the significance of DSH-340B sites.  This is probably because there is an upward trend 







Regression Results Using Lag of Drug Price 
 
Υlog_of_real_drug_ASP = βlog_of_DSH_340B_entities + βlag_1_log_of_real_drug_ASP + ε   
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A lag of the log of the real drug price was added to the base model to construct a time series 
model. The lag dependent variable was strongly predictive of the log of drug prices for every group 
indicating trends in drug prices.  DSH-340B is statistically significant for group C, though the impact 










1. Alpert, A., His, H., & Jacobson, M. (2017). Evaluating the Role of Payment Policy in Driving 
Vertical Integration in the Oncology Market. Health Affairs, 36(4), 680-688. 
 
2. Anderson, Richard. (2014). Pharmaceutical industry gets high on fat profits. BBC News. 
November 6, 2014. BBC http://www.bbc.com/news/business-28212223 
 
3. Avalere Health LLC. (2016). Hospital Acquisitions of Physician Practices and the 340B 
Program. http://340breform.org/userfiles/Avalere%20Acquisition.pdf 
 
4. Castellon, Y. M., Bazargan-Hejazi, S., Masatsugu, M., & Contreras, R. (2014). The impact of 
patient assistance programs and the 340B Drug Pricing Program on medication cost. The 
American journal of managed care, 20(2), 146-150. 
 
5. Conti, R. & Bach, P. (2013). Cost Consequences of the 340B Drug Discount Program, JAMA, 
309(19), 1995-1996. 
 
6. Conti, R. M., & Berndt, E. R. (2014). Specialty drug prices and utilization after loss of US patent 
exclusivity, 2001-2007 (No. w20016). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
7. Conti, R. M., & Bach, P. B. (2014). The 340B drug discount program: hospitals generate 
profits by expanding to reach more affluent communities. Health Affairs, 33(10), 1786-1792. 
 




9. Ginsburg, P.B. (2016). Testimony to California Legislature, Senate Committee on Health, 
Informational Hearing- Health Care Market Consolidations: Impacts on Costs, Quality and 
Access, March 16, 2016. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/Ginsburg-California-Senate-Health-Mar-16-1.pdf 
 
10. Howard, D. H., Bach, P. B., Berndt, E. R., & Conti, R. M. (2015). Pricing in the market for 
anticancer drugs. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29(1), 139-162. 
 
11. Jacobson, M., Earle, CC., Price, M., & Newhouse, JP. (2010). How Medicare’s Payment Cuts for 
Cancer Chemotherapy Drugs Changed Patterns of Treatment. Health Affairs, 29(7), 1391-
1399. 
 
12. Langreth, R., Migliozzi, B., & Gokhale, K. (2015). The U.S. Pays a Lot More for Top Drugs 






13. Light, D. W., & Kantarjian, H. (2013). Market spiral pricing of cancer drugs. Cancer, 119(22), 
3900-3902. 
 
14. Medicare Payment Advisory Commission. (2016). Report to Congress: Overview of the 340B 
Drug Pricing program. May 2015.http://www.medpac.gov/documents/reports/may-2015-
report-to-the-congress-overview-of-the-340b-drug-pricing-program.pdf 
 
15. Mulcahy, A.W., Armstrong, C., Lewis, J., & Mattke, S. (2014). The 340B Prescription Drug 
Discount Program. Perspective: Expert insights in a timely policy issue, Rand Corporation.   
 
16. Pew Charitable Trust (Pew). (2013). Persuading the Prescribers: Pharmaceutical Industry 





17. United States. Congressional Budget Office. (1996). How the Medicaid Rebate on Prescription 
Drugs Affects Pricing in the Pharmaceutical Industry. Congressional Budget Office. 
 
18. United States. Government Accountability Office. (2015). Medicare Part B Drugs: Action 
Needed to Reduce Financial Incentives to Prescribe 340B Drugs at Participating Hospitals. 
GAO-15-422.  http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-442 
 
19. Vandervelde, A. (2014). Growth of the 340B Program: Past trends, Future Projections, White 




20. Zafar, S. Y., Peppercorn, J. M., Schrag, D., Taylor, D. H., Goetzinger, A. M., Zhong, X., & 
Abernethy, A. P. (2013). The financial toxicity of cancer treatment: a pilot study assessing 
out-of-pocket expenses and the insured cancer patient's experience. The Oncologist, 18(4), 
381-390. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
